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Abstract 
 
The paper develops an optimal control model to analyse various management options for 
infectious diseases that occur in metapopulations, under both Nash and cooperative behaviour. 
As pathogens are renewable resources with negative value, the problem may be non-convex. 
Since the disease can be transmitted across various connected populations, externalities are 
involved.  Both aspects deserve attention as two issues arise: a) is eradication of the disease in 
finite time preferable to indefinite treatment? b) are cooperative solutions well-behaved? The 
problem is solved numerically and the results indicate that while eradication is likely to be an 
optimal strategy when initial levels of infections are relatively low, the internalisation of 
between-population externalities (as indicated by the first order necessary conditions of the 
cooperative optimal control problem) might not always be possible. Also, ignoring these two 
aspects can lead to inadequate policy design. 
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1 Introduction 
The emergence of new infectious diseases has gained significant attention on the policy agenda 
as recent initiatives both in the USA and in the UK call for interdisciplinary research to better 
understand the spread and to better manage infectious agents1. Traditionally, the study of 
disease dynamics has been the realm of mathematical epidemiology (e.g., Bailey 1975; Anderson 
and May 1991), whose initial remit has been to understand the properties of a system invaded 
by a pathogen.  
One prominent concept in epidemiology is the basic reproductive ratio of an infection (or other 
metrics related to it, e.g., Roberts and Heesterbeek 2003), also known as R0, which indicates the 
number of secondary cases of infections generated by one primary case. As in an uninvaded 
system the infection will spread if and only if R0>1, the epidemiological literature focuses on 
control measure that can bring R0<1 so as to achieve eradication in finite time. As it is not clear 
how control should be distributed over time, it is commonly assumed that the effort should be 
constant over time (e.g., Anderson and May 1991).  
More recently bioeconomic approaches to disease management have been advocated (e.g., 
Fenichel et al. 2010; Fenichel and Horan 2007, a, b; Barrett and Hoel 2007), since infectious 
diseases can be modelled as a renewable resource with negative value whose control through 
the use of limited means involves trade-offs. It is normal to frame the disease management 
question into an optimal control (OC) problem requiring the maximisation of some objective 
function depending on the fraction of healthy and susceptible individuals and control costs, 
given some initial conditions and the equations describing the dynamics of the infection. The 
main contrasts between the bioeconomic approaches and those based solely on mathematical 
epidemiology concern the desirability of eradication (compared to other possible outcomes, like 
steady-state solutions) and the resulting optimal allocation of control effort over time (as 
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opposed to a constant control). Gersovitz (2003) asks “whether settling for an internal steady-state 
with positive infection is dominated by a push for eradication in finite time” (as reported in Barrett 
and Hoel 2007 p. 629). The question of whether it is optimal to exhaust a renewable resource 
(like a disease) in finite time or to maintain the system indefinitively in steady-state is not new 
in economics and relates to the existence of non-convexities. Lewis and Schmalensee (1977), for 
example, look at the optimal management of a renewable resource (a fishery) when non-
convexities (due to the presence of fixed costs) exist. In particular they compare two sets of 
policies: a) driving the system towards a steady-state in an infinitely long horizon (the 
„continuous harvesting solution‟) and b) exhausting the resource in finite time (the 
„abandonment solution‟). Because of the fixed costs, convergence to the steady-state might not 
be optimal. In fact the authors claim that “...the presence of non-convexities can radically alter the 
nature of the optimal resource management strategy. Without numerically evaluating alternative payoffs, 
one cannot be sure in general that continuous harvesting will be superior to abandonment” (p. 348). In 
the case of infectious diseases non-convexities could arise because the resource under 
consideration has a negative value (Rondeau 2001). Barrett and Hoel (2007) develop a 
theoretical model and derive an intuitive cost-benefit rule for eradication (i.e., when the 
marginal costs of vaccination are relatively low compared to the „discounted‟ marginal damages 
of the infection). This paper also extends their analysis to the case of multiple connected 
populations. 
Early models of epidemics assumed a single homogenous population (Keeling and Rohani 2008, 
provide a good introduction), while subsequently this restrictive assumption has been relaxed 
in order to allow for heterogeneity, as contact rates between different subgroups in the 
population are likely to vary. Among the many factors which determine the degree of 
heterogeneity in a given population, the spatial distribution of its various subgroups is 
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particularly important in explaining the probability of a system being invaded and the 
persistence of the infection (Park et al. 2001; Keeling 1999; Hagenaars et al. 2004). The recent 
cases of swine flu pandemics and avian influenza show the importance of spatial connectivity in 
disease dynamics, as some diseases can be transmitted over long ranges by migrating 
populations (Waldenström et al. 2007; Stallknecht and Brown 2007) and/or through travel and 
trade (Kilpatrick et al. 2006).  
The management of infectious diseases over a number of separate but connected populations is 
likely to involve reciprocal externalities, as control of the disease in one particular region will 
generate some benefits to all regions (e.g., Barrett 2003; Sandler and Arce 2002). It is then 
natural to model the non-cooperative solution, to identify the corresponding Nash equilibria, 
and the cooperative solution, to identify the optimal management rule. In fact, by comparing 
the first order necessary conditions (FONC) of the cooperative solution with those of the non-
cooperative one, it should be possible to identify a suitable way (e.g., taxes, subsidies, etc.) to 
internalise the externalities and ameliorate welfare. However, if the problem is non-convex can 
the FONC still be relied upon to indicate the appropriate strategy to internalize the 
externalities? To the best of my knowledge, this aspect has not been formally addressed yet in 
the context of infectious diseases. Rowthorn et al. (2009), for example, apply an OC framework 
to the management of an infectious disease over two connected populations, but they only 
consider the cooperative solution. Similarly, Mbah and Gilligan (2009) consider an analogous 
problem, where disease transmission between different species is allowed. The purpose of this 
paper is then to shed light on the implications of non-convexities, for the optimal management 
of an infectious disease occurring over several connected populations, with respect to: a) the 
choice between eradication policies and convergence to steady-states and b) the ability to 
identify a suitable way to internalise the disease spill over. 
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2 Spatial models of epidemics 
Several approaches have been explored in order to deal with the effects of spatial heterogeneity 
on epidemics (e.g., McCallum 2008). The most common ones fall in the following categories: 
reaction-diffusion models, network models and metapopulation models. Such a classification is 
not clear-cut as, for example, network approaches (e.g., lattice and cellular automata) have been 
used to study the behaviour of a metapopulation. In this section I will focus on network models 
and metapopulation models, as diffusion-reaction models can be thought of as a special case of 
the metapopulation approach (Smith et al. 2009).   
 
2.1 Networks and epidemics 
In network models each individual is assigned a fixed set of „contacts‟ to which it can transmit 
the infection (see Keeling and Eames 2005, for a review of network models in epidemics). Here 
I will refer to network models as those in which, each node is the smallest unit of analysis (e.g., 
infected person or infected premise) and the dynamic processes within the node are not 
considered. The attention is focused on characterizing the network structure (e.g. small-world, 
scale-free, random, lattice etc.) for the disease under consideration and, through computer 
simulations, understanding the implications for the disease dynamics. So for example, it appears 
that infectious diseases can spread more easily in scale-free and small-world networks than in 
regular lattices and random networks. Closely related to the network approach is the use of 
lattice/cellular automata (LCA) models, which allows explicit representation of the spatial 
distribution of the nodes. LCA models are discrete dynamical system formed by a finite number 
of cells, where each cell is endowed with a state (e.g. susceptible, infected, recovered etc.) which 
changes at each step following a transition rule (e.g., White et al. 2007). In LCA models the 
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spread of the disease occurs through the interaction between each individual/node with its 
immediate neighbourhood. Su et al. (2009), for example, use a LCA model to investigate the 
effects of spatial clustering and habitat loss on a parasite-host (prey-predator) system and their 
results show that both phenomena (i.e., habitat loss and degree of clustering) have important 
consequences on both the dynamics and equilibrium of the system. 
 
2.2 Metapopulation and epidemics 
The metapopulation2 framework (Levin 1976), on the other hand, provides a useful starting 
point to address the issue of spatial heterogeneity in epidemiological models in situations where 
one wants to investigate also the dynamics within each local deme. Indeed the way Rowthorn 
et al. (2009)  and Mbah and Gilligan (2009)  deal with spatial heterogeneity in their 
epidemiological framework closely resembles a metapopulation approach. Metapopulation 
frameworks have also been used to explore the effect of host mobility (Rodriguez and Torres-
Sorando, 2001) on disease dynamics. 
 
3 The ecological constraints and the ecological approach to infectious diseases policies 
I begin with the characterisation of the epidemiological model which underlies the entire 
analysis.  Consider the case of an infectious disease occurring in two3 spatially distinct 
populations (regions) and allow for transmission between these populations to occur. The 
dynamics of the disease in the i-th region are expressed in terms of a classical Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model with total (constant) population Ni, i=1,2. This class of models 
is appropriate to describe bacterial or parasitic infections for which no permanent immunity 
exists (see Bailey 1975, for an introduction to the SIS model). The population is partitioned into 
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susceptible (Si) and infected/infectious (Ii) individuals.  If disease transmission between 
individuals of different populations is allowed, the equations of motion of the infection4 can be 
expressed as follows (e.g., Rowthorn et al. 2009) 
 
   (1) 
 
where ui represents the level of (public/collective) control (treatment)5 in the i-th region, αi is 
the effectiveness of the control, βi is the infectiousness of the disease, ωi is the recovery rate 
associated with the disease (ω-1 is the duration of the disease) and pji indicates the probability of 
disease transmission from the j-th to the i-th region. This version of the SIS model is relatively 
simple as it ignores the fact that some parameter values might change with the progression of 
the epidemics, for example as a result of individuals‟ defensive behavior (D‟Onofrio and 
Mandfredi 2009). Such a simplification is introduced in order to focus the attention on public 
management decisions of epidemics (ui in this case).  
One way to illustrate the dynamics of the system is to draw the zero-isoclines associated with 
(1). The important thing to notice is that at this stage the controls (ui) enter the equations of 
motion as exogenous factors.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
For example, in figure 1, I parameterize (1) and represent the dynamics for three different 
levels of control.  The left panel is drawn for u1=u2=0. In the un-controlled system there is 
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only one steady-state (which is a locally asymptotically stable node), other than the origin 
(which is unstable), and the infection will naturally progress towards the steady-state. The 
central panel is drawn for intermediate levels of control (u1=u2=0.2). In this case the system 
has two steady-state equilibria: a high infection equilibrium (which is a locally asymptotically 
stable node) and a low infection equilibrium (which is a saddle point). For intermediate levels of 
control, eradication (i.e., bringing the system to the origin) is possible, depending on initial 
conditions. The right panel is drawn for high levels of control (u1=u2=0.3). In this case the 
system has two equilibria with complex roots but again eradication is possible, depending on 
the initial conditions. 
Figure 1 provides a representation of the epidemiologists‟ approach to the management of an 
infectious disease. Given the prevalence of the disease at a given point in time (the initial 
conditions of the system), a constant level of control can be determined so as to achieve 
complete eradication. However, when framing the problem in a bioeconomic fashion the level of 
control is endogenously determined (e.g., Fenichel et al. 2010) and the phase-space becomes 
four-dimensional. For this reason the representation in Figure 1 can give only an incomplete 
picture. 
 
4 Bioeconomic approaches to infectious disease management: the general model 
As the ecological constraints have been illustrated, the purpose of this section is to provide a 
general characterisation of the economic problem at hand. The main objective of the paper is to 
investigate some of the implications of non-convexities in an OC problem of epidemics 
management in a metapopulation. As a more detailed discussion on the second order sufficient 
conditions (SOSC) is presented in subsequent sections and in the Appendix, at this stage it is 
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important to correctly frame the problem so that admits solution. If an existence theorem 
applies, then at least one can be sure that the FONC identify the set of candidates for an 
optimal solution even when the SOSC do not hold (Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1987, p. 11). 
The fact that the two populations are connected implies that there is a finite probability p that 
the infected individuals in one region can transmit the disease to susceptible individuals in the 
other region, reflecting the existence of an externality. Here I assume that the probability of 
between-regions disease transmission is exogenously given. Although it is possible to envisage 
situations in which this hypothesis is not appropriate, there are a number of cases in which it 
will hold. For example, the connectiveness of two relatively small regions as a result of 
similarity in climatic conditions is likely to be exogenous, as it is unlikely that the policies 
followed in such regions could alter the pattern of climate therefore changing the value of p. 
Similarly the existence of migrating species (e.g., birds) provides a connection path between 
locations that can be distant even hundreds or thousands of miles and although in principle 
such migration routes could be altered, in many cases such course of action will be politically or 
economically unfeasible (e.g., endangered migratory species that nest in natural reserves and 
carry pathogens that can be transmitted to domesticated species and/or to humans). In these 
cases adaptation policies are likely to be more important. 
Assuming that the infection generates a cost (e.g., people not turning in for work etc.) and that 
control is costly, the framework is naturally one of cost minimization over time. The objective 
of the managers will somehow involve choosing the appropriate level of  public 
control/treatment over time to minimize the discounted flow of damages associated with the 
disease , with , and the costs of its control 
, with . Two possible situations are 
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considered, namely the case in which each manager (in each region) acts non-cooperatively (i.e., 
Nash behaviour) and the case in which a single „meta-regional‟ manager exists (i.e., cooperative 
solution).  
 
4.1 The non-cooperative case 
Formally, in this case I am interested in finding the Open Loop Nash Equilibrium (OLNE) of a 
differential game (Basar and Losder 1999). Notice that OLNE solutions need not to be thought 
of as equilibria emerging in the complete absence of negotiation, but rather they can be thought 
of as results of negotiations on agreements that are self-enforcing (Dockner and Long 1993). 
The general problem for the i-th region can be expressed as follows (the problem for region 2 is 
analogous) 
 
   (2.a) 
Subject to (1) and 
 (2.b) 
(2.c) 
 
The term  in (2.a) represents the scrap value associated with the free terminal stock 
 and I assume  and . Problem (2.a, 2.b, 2.c) is framed in the most 
general way, with free terminal state and free terminal horizon (as T is a choice variable in 2.a) 
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and it encompasses as special cases both eradication in finite time and convergence to steady-
state in infinite time. In fact, drawing on Barrett and Hoel (2007) eradication in finite time can 
be represented by adapting (2.a, 2.c) as follows 
 
  (2.d) 
Subject to (1, 2.b) and 
(2.e) 
 
As the terminal condition in (2.e) requires eradication by the terminal time T, the scrap value 
function Fi is omitted from (2.d). 
As in Lewis and Schmalensee (1977), convergence to steady-state in infinite time is obtained by 
modifying (2.a, 2.c) as follows  
 
  (2.f) 
Subject to (1, 2.b, 2.c) 
 
Given the infinite horizon, the scrap value function is omitted again. 
It is possible to show that problem (2) admits a solution (see Appendix A.1), therefore one can 
be sure that even if the problem turns out to be non-convex the FONC will identify possible 
candidates for a solution.  
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4.2 The cooperative case 
In the cooperative case, the general problem can be formulated as follows 
 
  (3.a) 
Subject to (1) and  ,   (3.b) 
 
Even in this case, eradication in finite time is obtained by adapting (3.a, 3.b) as follows 
 
  (3.c) 
Subject to (1, 2.b),    (3.d) 
 
Where the scrap value functions Fi are omitted, as eradication by time T is imposed. 
Convergence to steady-state in infinite time is given by (omitting the scrap value functions) 
 
  (3.e) 
Subject to (1, 3.b) 
 
Problem (3) also admits solution, and the same considerations as before apply.  
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5 A numerical application 
This section develops a numerical application to illustrate the implications of non convexities in 
the management of epidemics in a metapopulation with respect to a) the choice between 
eradication in finite time and stabilisation and b) the ability of the FONC associated with the 
cooperative outcome to signal the proper strategy to internalise the between-region spill over. 
The purpose of the application is entirely illustrative, as no attempt has been made to represent 
a specific situation (although most of the parameter values and functional forms have been 
chosen so as to resemble the analysis developed by Rowthorn et al. 2009). To some extent, the 
effect of non-convexities in OC problem have been analysed before. So for example Lewis and 
Schmalensee (1977) compare steady-state versus exhaustion in finite time of a renewable 
resource when fixed costs are present. Barrett and Hoel (2007) look at the choice between 
continuous vaccination and eradication of a disease in finite time. Tahvonen and Salo (1996), 
Rondeau (2001) and Brock and Starrett (2003) show how in non-convex problems multiple 
steady-states can emerge and the choice of which steady-state to approach may depend on the 
system‟s initial conditions. In all the cases above the analysis was greatly served by the use of 
graphical illustrations. Unfortunately the dimensionality of the problem does not allow me to 
rely on graphics and therefore I will rely on numerical solutions. As in Gersovitz and Hammer 
(2003), although quantitative results are reported, my interest is in their qualitative 
interpretation. All the numerical solutions have been obtained by using the bvp4c solver 
(Shampine et al. 2000) in Matlab (© Mathworks). 
I consider a symmetric case where the infection damage function is parametrised as 
, while the treatment cost function is 
 and the parameters in the epidemiological model (1) are chosen 
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as  and the 
discount rate is  
It has already been pointed out that the general problem admits solution both in the OLNE and 
in the cooperative case, while SOSC are openly tested in both cases. Two kinds of sufficiency 
theorems are normally reported in the literature: Mangasarian sufficiency theorems and 
Arrow-type sufficiency theorems (Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1987; Caputo 2005). Mangasarian 
sufficiency conditions require the Hamiltonian to be jointly convex in the state and control 
variable. On the other hand, Arrow-type sufficiency conditions are less stringent (normally 
they are applied when Mangasarian sufficient conditions fail) and require the Maximised 
Hamiltonian to be convex in the state variable. I use Arrow-type conditions and show that even 
though necessary Legendre-Clebsch conditions hold, the sign of the second order differential 
associated with the maximised Hamiltonian is indefinite, suggesting that the problem is neither 
convex nor concave (see Appendix A.2). 
 
5.1 The OLNE 
In the non-cooperative case I consider a) optimal eradication in finite time and b) convergence 
to a steady-state in infinite time. The problem is solved numerically by considering three 
different initial conditions. 
 
5.1.1 Eradication in finite time 
Due to the symmetric nature of the differential game eradication will be simultaneous in the 
two regions. Given the chosen functional forms, problem (2.d, 2.e) becomes 
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  (4.a) 
subject to (1),   and  (4.b) 
and   (4.c) 
 
The current value Hamiltonian associated with (4) is 
 
  (5) 
 
and the FONC for an internal solution include (1) and 
 
  (6.a) 
  (6.b) 
  (6.c) 
  (6.d) 
 
Through some manipulation (6.a, 6.b) can be used to obtain an equation of motion in the 
control variable 
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  (7) 
 
The four-equation system (7, 1) is a boundary value problem (BVP) with initial conditions 
given by  terminal conditions given by   and is solved numerically 
with the bvp4c routine by implementing a shooting method (Judd 1998). As in this problem the 
terminal time T is free, I use condition (6.c) to identify its optimal value. After substituting (6.a) 
in (6.c), the latter implies ui(T)=0. The value of T in the BVP problem is then adjusted so as to 
meet this condition. 
When the initial level of infection is relatively low, with , eradication occurs in T=7 and 
the net present value (NPV) of the programme stands at £ 2.196 (in each region). The 
corresponding time path of the disease prevalence I1(t) and control u1(t) for region 1 are 
illustrated in figures 2.a and 2.b (cross marker).  
 
[Figures 2.a and 2.b here] 
 
When the initial level of infection is increased, with , eradication takes longer and 
occurs in T=14 and the NPV of the programme stands at £ 6.588 (in each region). The 
corresponding infection prevalence and control paths are illustrated in figures 3.a and 3.b (cross 
marker). Finally, when the initial level of infection is relatively high, , eradication in 
finite time is not optimal as I am unable to find a value of T which satisfies all the FONC.  
 
 
17 
[Figures 3.a and 3.b here] 
 
5.1.2 Convergence to steady-state 
For the chosen functional forms, problem (2.f) can be rewritten as  
 
  (8.a) 
subject to (1),   and  (8.b) 
 
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is unchanged (see expression 5) and for an 
interior solution the FONC are given by (6.a, 6.b) and the Arrow-type transversality condition 
. The FONC can be manipulated to yield four differential equations 
given by (1) and (7) and the system can be solved for steady-state. In total 9 steady-states are 
identified, but after ruling out degenerate equilibria (i.e., complex roots and/or negative roots 
and/or Ii>1) only 2 are left, as indicated in Table 1. An analysis of the Jacobian matrix 
associated with the dynamic system reveals that both steady-states are saddle points (see 
Appendix A.3). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Convergence to the steady-state is obtained numerically by implementing a shooting method 
with the bvp4c routine, where the two boundary values are given by the steady-state 
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equilibrium and the initial conditions (Judd 1998). After various attempts it turns out that for 
initial conditions  only steady-state A can be approached. When the initial 
infection is low, with , the NPV of the programme stands at £ 10.116 (per region) and 
the associated infection and control paths (for region 1 only) are illustrated in figures 4.a and 
4.b (cross marker).  
 
[Figures 4.a and 4.b here] 
 
For higher levels of initial infection, with , the NPV of the programme stands at £ 
12.179 and the associated infection and control paths are illustrated in figures 5.a and 5.b (cross 
marker).  
 
[Figures 5.a and 5.b here] 
 
Finally, for , the NPV of the programme stands at £ 13.977 and the associated 
infection and control paths are illustrated in figures 6.a and 6.b (cross marker). 
 
[Figures 6.a and 6.b here] 
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The results up to this point suggest that, under OLNE conditions, eradication is possible only 
when initial levels of infections are not too high (as already noted by Barrett and Hoel 2007) 
and the NPV of the corresponding programme is increasing in the initial level of infection. This 
latter conclusion holds also along the paths converging to the steady-state. 
 
5.2 The cooperative solution 
Even in the cooperative case I consider two possibilities, namely a) optimal eradication in finite 
time and b) convergence to a steady-state in infinite time. Again the problem is solved by 
considering three different initial conditions. 
 
5.2.1 Eradication in finite time 
In this case problem (3.c, 3.d) becomes 
 
  (9.a) 
subject to (1),   and   (9.b) 
and   (9.c) 
 
The current value Hamiltonian associated with (9) is  
 
  (10) 
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and the FONC for an internal solution are 
 
  (11.a) 
   (11.b) 
  (11.c) 
 (11.d) 
 
After some manipulation (11.a, 11.b) yield differential equations for the control variables 
 
  (12) 
 
whose solution generates the cooperative outcome. Notice the difference between (12) and (7). 
Under cooperative behaviour the level of control in region i along the optimal path explicitly 
takes into account the effects on marginal treatment costs in region j (i.e., the term 
 in 12).  
The system (12, 1) with initial conditions given by  and terminal conditions 
given by   is a boundary value problem (BVP) and is solved numerically with 
the bvp4c routine. As the terminal time T is free, I use condition (17.c) to identify its optimal 
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value. After substituting (11.a) in (11.c), the latter implies ui(T)=0. The value of T in the BVP 
problem is then adjusted so as to meet this condition. 
For low initial infections levels, with , eradication occurs in T=4 (earlier than in the 
OLNE case) and the NPV associated with the programme stands at £ 2.353 (per region). The 
infection and control paths (only for region 1) are illustrated in figures 2.a and 2.b (square 
marker). The level of control in this case is initially larger than in the OLNE but declines at a 
faster rate, while the prevalence of the infection is always lower. The NPV associated with the 
cooperative outcome is worse (i.e., larger) than the one obtained in the OLNE, something 
which is difficult to accept as two cooperative agents can at least replicate what two non-
cooperative agents are doing. This result, which may be a consequence of the non-convexities 
in the problem and is further discussed in the last section of this paper, suggests that the 
internalisation strategy identified by the FONC of the cooperative outcome cannot be relied 
upon. For higher levels of initial infections, with , eradication occurs in T=7 (earlier 
than in the OLNE case) and the NPV associated with the programme stands at £ 6.382 (per 
region). The corresponding infection and control paths (only for region 1) are presented in 
figures 3.a and 3.b (square marker). In this case the cooperative solution outperforms (i.e., the 
NPV is lower) the OLNE. This result is not in contrast with the one obtained above, as our 
problem is neither convex nor concave (remember that the sign of the second order differential 
associated with the maximised Hamiltonian for problem 9 is indefinite). Finally, for high initial 
levels of infection with , eradication in finite time is not possible (a result analogous to 
the one obtained in the OLNE). 
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5.2.2 Convergence to steady-state 
Finally problem (3.e) becomes 
 
  (13.a) 
subject to (1),   and   (13.b) 
 
The current value Hamiltonian is unchanged (see expression 10) and for an interior solution 
the FONC are given by (11.a, 11.b) and the Arrow-type transversality condition 
. The FONC can be manipulated to yield four differential 
equations given by (1) and (12) and this system can be solved for steady-state. In total 9 steady-
states are identified, but after ruling out degenerate equilibria (i.e., complex roots and/or 
negative roots and/or Ii>1) only 2 are left, as indicated in Table 2. An analysis of the Jacobian 
matrix associated with the dynamic system reveals that both steady-states are saddle points 
(see Appendix A.3). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Convergence to the steady-state is obtained numerically by implementing a shooting method 
with the bvp4c routine. After various attempts it turns out that for initial conditions 
 only steady-state A can be approached. When the initial infection is low, 
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with , the NPV of the programme stands at £ 11.256 (per region), an outcome which 
ranks below the one obtained in the OLNE. The associated infection and control paths (for 
region 1 only) are illustrated in figures 4.a and 4.b (square marker). The infection prevalence is 
initially higher than in the OLNE, but then reaches a lower steady-state. Control is initially 
lower than in the OLNE, but it finally rests on a higher steady-state. For higher levels of initial 
infection, with , the NPV of the programme stands at £ 12.498 (again underperforming 
the OLNE solution) and the associated infection and control paths are illustrated in figures 5.a 
and 5.b (square marker). In this case infection prevalence is always lower than in the OLNE, 
while the level of control is always higher. Finally, for , the NPV of the programme 
stands at £ 13.967, therefore (just) outperforming the OLNE, and the associated infection and 
control paths are illustrated in figures 6.a and 6.b (square marker). Even in this case infection 
prevalence is always lower than in the OLNE, while the level of control is always higher. 
The results indicate that even under cooperative behaviour, eradication is possible only when 
initial levels of infections are not too high (as already noted by Barrett and Hoel 2007) and the 
NPV of the corresponding programme is increasing in the initial value of infection. This latter 
conclusion holds also along the paths converging to the steady-state. The cooperative solutions 
underperform the OLNE in three circumstances (i.e., in the eradication case with low initial 
levels of infection and in the convergence to steady-state with low and intermediate levels of 
infections), an aspect which leads to question the ability of the FONC associated with the non-
convex cooperative problem to identify the appropriate way to internalise externalities.  
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6 Discussion 
As noted in the early sections, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the implications of 
non-convexities in the OC of epidemics across two connected regions/populations. In 
particular two aspects deserve attention: a) whether eradication is preferable to indefinite 
treatment and b) how to internalize the between-region externalities. 
The results of the model are summarized in Table 3, where the optimal policies (i.e., those 
yielding the lowest NPV) for each set of initial conditions are indicated in bold.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
With respect to point a), Lewis and Schmalensee (1977) conclude that the choice between 
eradication and convergence to steady-state requires the numerical evaluation of the associated 
payoffs. The application developed in this paper suggests that eradication in finite time turns to 
be optimal only when the initial levels of infection are not too high (although the optimal time 
of eradication is positively correlated with the initial infection levels), a result consistent with 
those of Barrett and Hoel (2007, pp. 638-639). For high initial levels of infection, on the other 
hand, the optimal solution is to converge to the steady-state. In this case, along the optimal 
path converging to the (cooperative) steady-state the prevalence of the disease decreases 
smoothly while the corresponding level of control increases gradually. This pattern, suggesting 
a negative relationship between the level of control and the prevalence of a disease, is 
illustrated in Figure 7.c and has been used as a sort of feedback rule to guide optimal 
management of epidemics (Goldman and Lightwood 2002). The intuition behind this „golden 
rule‟ is that when disease prevalence is high, the risk of re-infection is also high and the return 
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to control is therefore low. However, for low/moderate initial levels of infections, along the 
respective optimal eradication paths the prevalence of the disease and the level of control 
decline, indicating a positive relationship between control and prevalence (as illustrated in 
Figures 7.a and 7.b). Therefore informing public health policies on the basis of the „golden rule‟ 
might be inappropriate as the non-convex nature of the problem might require either 
eradication or convergence to the steady-state, depending on initial conditions. 
 
[Figures 7.a, 7.b and 7.c here] 
 
Point b) also requires careful discussion. To the best of my knowledge the existing 
environmental economic literature in OC has looked at the effects of non-convexity with 
respect to the multiplicity of steady-states and the implications for optimal management (e.g., 
Tahvonen and Salo 1996; Rondeau 2001; Brock and Starrett 2003)6.  However, as the problem I 
consider also involves externalities between various agents, a novel aspect emerges in that one 
should consider both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. Rowthorn et al. (2009), for 
example, look at the optimal control of epidemics in two connected populations (and show that 
the problem is non-convex) but only consider cooperative solutions. My results point out that 
cooperative solutions do not always perform better than OLNE, which is difficult to accept in 
concrete, as two cooperating agents should at least be able to replicate the outcome of non-
cooperating agents. This could be the consequence of the non-convexities in the problem, 
indicating that the FONC of the cooperative solution might not be relied upon to identify a 
corrective mechanism to internalize the between-region externalities. Although providing a 
rigorous proof of this statement is beyond the remit of the paper, there are some results in 
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cooperative game theory that point in this direction, as it appears that when the problem is 
non-convex there are difficulties with the cooperative solutions. Barucci (2000), for example, 
considers an infinite horizon differential game of capital accumulation (with non-convexities 
due to positive spill-over between firms) in both the non-cooperative (OLNE) and cooperative 
framework. He shows that in the linear-quadratic case the OLNE exists, while the cooperative 
solution does not. Engwerda (2007) examines the sufficient conditions for optimal strategies 
(equivalent to the cooperative solution discussed here) in finite time and free terminal state 
cooperative differential games and shows that such conditions bear a close resemblance to the 
Arrow sufficiency theorem (i.e., requiring the joint convexity of the maximized Hamiltonian in 
the state variable) for an OC problem. Although the author is not able to generalize his results 
to free-time problems (as problems (2) and (3) here would require), it seems that when non-
convexities are present the OC problem is not well-behaved, in which case the FONC may fail 
to signal the correct cooperative mechanism to internalize externalities. Perhaps this is an 
aspect which calls for further investigation. 
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Notes 
1 In 2009 the National Science Foundation in the US opened a call for interdisciplinary research 
to look at the Ecology of Infectious Diseases (National Science Foundation, 2009). Also in 
2009, an initiative was launched in the UK by various Research Councils led by the Medical 
Research Council, to undertake interdisciplinary research to look at the Environmental and 
Social Ecology of Human Infectious Diseases (Medical Research Council, 2009). 
2 A metapopulation consists of a group of spatially separated populations (i.e. local demes), 
interacting with each other at some level. 
3 The use of two regions greatly simplifies both the analysis and the notation, while it still 
allows one to think about a general n regions case. 
4 Notice that as the total population in each region is constant, the dynamics of the susceptible 
populations can be obtained simply by changing the sign of (1). 
5 As our model describes the dynamics of a disease in a region, the control must be qualified as 
public/collective. In this model treatment removes infected/infectious individuals. In an 
alternative model treatment could affect the infectiousness of the disease (β) and/or the 
probability of between-regions transmission (p) and/or the recovery rate (ω). 
6 The papers show that when multiple steady-states exist, optimal management trajectories 
may depend on initial conditions. Similarly in my model multiple steady-states exist, but for 
plausible initial conditions only one steady-state can be approached. 
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APPENDICES 
A.1 Existence Theorems 
In what follows I prove the existence of solutions to problems (2) in both free finite terminal 
time (as implemented in problem 4) and infinite horizon (as implemented in problem 8). The 
proof for the cooperative case (i.e., problem 3 and its implementations in finite and infinite 
horizon) is omitted as it is be entirely analogous to the one here presented. 
 
A.1.1 Free finite terminal time 
This proof is based on theorem 5.5 in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). Let the control space be 
. First of all notice that as  are continuous function, the first 
requirement of the theorem is met. Also, by assumption in problem (2) and its implementation 
in finite time (4), . Therefore by setting b=1, the second requirement of the theorem 
is also met. The final requirement calls for the convexity of the set 
 
which I will now prove, drawing on Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). 
Keeping  constant let x and y be two arbitrary points in N defined as 
 
and 
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Let , then it is sufficient to prove that . By 
definition 
 
The term in the curly brackets can be developed into 
  
where . Then it follows that 
 which in turn implies that 
.  
By definition  
. 
Then we found a  and a  such that for two arbitrary points in N, x and y, and 
for , 
. 
 
A.1.2 Infinite time horizon 
I extend theorem 5.5 to infinite horizon by using theorem 3.15 in  Seierstad and Sydsaeter 
(1987). In this case the existence of a solution has some additional requirements to those 
presented in A.1.1. First of all notice that in our case  and therefore setting 
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, it follows that  which satisfies the requirement of the theorem. 
Also by setting , the last requirement of the theorem becomes 
. As in our case  and , 
even this requirement is trivially satisfied. 
 
A.2 Sufficiency Conditions 
Here I openly test Arrow-type sufficiency conditions for the OLNE (problems 4 and 8) and 
cooperative solution (problems 9 and 13). 
 
A.2.1 OLNE 
The current value Hamiltonian associated with problems (4) and (8) is 
 
  (A.1) 
 
First of all notice that the necessary Legendre-Clebesh condition is satisfied, as . 
After substituting the maximum condition (6.a) into (A.1) the corresponding Maximised 
Hamiltonian is 
 
  
(A.2) 
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The Arrow-type sufficiency requires the Maximised Hamiltonian to be jointly convex in the 
state variables I1 and I2 , which in turn requires the two principal minors of the Hessian 
matrix associated with (A..2) to be positive (Caputo 2005).  Focusing on region 1 (as the 
analysis for region 2 is symmetric), the Hessian matrix is 
 
  (A.3) 
 
As the determinant is , the quadratic form associated with the second order 
differential will never be positive semidefinite. Moreover the first principal minor will be 
positive if and only if , which in turn would require  and therefore is never 
satisfied. Therefore the quadratic form associated with the second order differential is 
indefinite, suggesting that the Maximised Hamiltonian is neither convex nor concave, and the 
sufficient conditions are not met. 
 
A.2.2 Cooperative Solution 
The current value Hamiltonian associated with problems (9) and (13) is 
 
  (A.4) 
 
Even in this case the necessary Legendre-Clebesh condition is satisfied, as . After 
applying conditions (11.a), the Maximised Hamiltonian is given by 
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(A.5) 
 
The corresponding Hessian Matrix is 
 
  (A.6) 
 
Positive definitiveness of the quadratic form associated with the second order differential of 
(A.5) again requires the two principal minors of (A.6) to be positive . For our parameter 
values this implies  (which is never satisfied, as it would require )  and 
. The second inequality will be satisfied in 
regions I and III of figure A.1. Given the values of μi along the solution paths presented in 
Table A.1, it follows that the sign of the second-order differential associated with (A.5) is 
indefinite. Therefore the sufficient conditions are not satisfied. 
 
[Figure A.1 here] 
[Table A.1 here] 
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A.3 Dynamic stability of the Steady-State solutions 
A.3.1. OLNE 
The FONC for problem (8) can be reduced to expressions (1) and (7), which evaluated in 
steady-state define a system of 4 equations in 4 variables (ui, Ii, i=1,2). The system has 9 steady-
states of which only two are non-degenerate: A = {ui=0.032, Ii=0.8} and B = { ui=0.26, 
Ii=0.42}.  For our parameter values the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix associated with the 
FONC, evaluated at steady-state A are , suggesting that 
steady-state A is a saddle point. For steady-state B the corresponding eigenvalues are given by 
. As the real parts of the eigenvalues have 
alternate signs, even steady-state B is a saddle point. 
 
A.3.2. Cooperative Solution 
In the cooperative solutions also two non-degenerate steady-states emerge: A = {ui=0.11, 
Ii=0.73} and B = { ui=0.17, Ii=0.67}. The corresponding eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
associated with the FONC (12, 1) are  and 
 respectively. Both A and B are saddle points. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Steady-states solutions under the OLNE 
Steady-States Values of the variable Dynamic Stability Properties 
u1 I1 u2 I2 
A 0.032 0.8 0.032 0.8 Saddle Point 
B 0.26 0.42 0.26 0.42 Saddle Point 
 
 
Table 2: Steady-states solutions under cooperative behaviour 
Steady-States Values of the variable Dynamic Stability Properties 
u1 I1 u2 I2 
A 0.11 0.73 0.11 0.73 Saddle Point 
B 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.67 Saddle Point 
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Table 3: summary of model results and optimal policies 
 Eradication Steady-State 
T NPV NPV 
 
   
OLNE 7 2.196 10.116 
Coop Sol 4 2.353 11.256 
 
   
OLNE 14 6.588 12.179 
Coop Sol 7 6.382 12.498 
 
   
OLNE n.a. n.a. 13.977 
Coop Sol n.a. n.a. 13.967 
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Table A.1: values of μi, i=1,2 in the cooperative solutions 
time Ii(0)=0.2, i=1,2 Ii(0)=0.5, i=1,2 Ii(0)=0.75, i=1,2 
Eradication Steady-State* Eradication Steady-State* Steady-State* 
0 11.14375 7.607431 12.88127 7.512677 6.03758 
1 9.742151 6.739839 12.86498 7.265778 6.046541 
2 8.258388 6.135221 12.24647 7.033097 6.054693 
3 6.856293 5.744482 11.13645 6.827313 6.062119 
4 5 5.512353 9.734023 6.655766 6.068888 
5 - 5.390732 8.250473 6.519624 6.075064 
6 - 5.342375 6.84924 6.414529 6.080704 
7 - 5.340357 5 6.332864 6.085858 
8 - 5.36611 - 6.266625 6.090572 
9 - 5.407291 - 6.209591 6.094885 
10 - 5.455957 - 6.158116 6.098834 
11 - 5.507175 - 6.110756 6.102452 
12 - 5.558004 - 6.067366 6.105767 
 
42 
13 - 5.606777 - 6.028255 6.108807 
14 - 5.652631 - 5.993676 6.111596 
15 - 5.695187 - 5.963644 6.114154 
16 - 5.734356 - 5.937986 6.116502 
17 - 5.770217 - 5.91644 6.118658 
18 - 5.802939 - 5.898745 6.120638 
19 - 5.832734 - 5.884675 6.122457 
20 - 5.859833 - 5.87403 6.124127 
21 - 5.884465 - 5.866612 6.125661 
22 - 5.906853 - 5.862208 6.127071 
23 - 5.927204 - 5.860577 6.128366 
24 - 5.94571 - 5.861454 6.129556 
25 - 5.962547 - 5.864555 6.130649 
26 - 5.977874 - 5.869586 6.131652 
27 - 5.991836 - 5.876254 6.132573 
28 - 6.004563 - 5.884279 6.133418 
 
43 
29 - 6.016172 - 5.893395 6.134193 
30 - 6.026769 - 5.903361 6.134902 
31 - 6.036448 - 5.913958 6.135551 
32 - 6.045297 - 5.924994 6.136145 
33 - 6.05339 - 5.936305 6.136686 
34 - 6.060798 - 5.94775 6.137178 
35 - 6.067584 - 5.959211 6.137624 
36 - 6.073804 - 5.970595 6.138027 
37 - 6.079509 - 5.981825 6.13839 
38 - 6.084746 - 5.992846 6.138713 
39 - 6.089557 - 6.003617 6.139 
40 - 6.09398 - 6.01411 6.13925 
41 - 6.098051 - 6.024311 6.139466 
42 - 6.101802 - 6.034216 6.139647 
43 - 6.105261 - 6.043832 6.139794 
44 - 6.108456 - 6.053173 6.139907 
 
44 
45 - 6.111411 - 6.062263 6.139985 
46 - 6.11415 - 6.07113 6.140028 
47 - 6.116694 - 6.079813 6.140033 
48 - 6.119063 - 6.088354 6.14 
49 - 6.121275 - 6.096804 6.14 
50 - 6.123349 - 6.10522 6.14 
51 - 6.125301 - 6.113669 6.14 
52 - 6.127147 - 6.122224 6.14 
53 - 6.128904 - 6.130969 6.14 
54 - 6.130587 - 6.14 6.14 
55 - 6.132211 - 6.14 6.14 
56 - 6.133791 - 6.14 6.14 
57 - 6.135344 - 6.14 6.14 
58 - 6.136885 - 6.14 6.14 
59 - 6.138431 - 6.14 6.14 
60 - 6.14 - 6.14 6.14 
* In any numerical simulation a steady-state will be approached in finite time. 
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Figure 1: Phase-plane diagram of system (1). The following parameter values have been used: 
α=0.2; β=0.2; ω=0.05; p=0.1; N1=N2=1. In the left panel, u1=u2=0 and the system converges to 
the only equilibrium point (a locally asymptotically stable node). The central panel is drawn for 
u1=u2=0.2 and two equilibria appear: a high infection one (which is a local asymptotically stable 
node) and a low infection one (which is a saddle).  For initial conditions given by point A, 
exerting a constant level of control equal to u1=u2=0.2 will lead to eradication in finite time. 
However for different initial conditions, as indicated by point B, the specified level of control 
will move the system towards the stable steady-state. The panel on the right is drawn for 
u1=u2=0.3, where the steady-state equilibria are complex. However for certain initial 
conditions, as indicated by point C, the specified level of control will lead to eradication in finite 
time. 
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Figure 2.a: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) eradication path for low initial levels of infection. 
 
 
Figure 2.b: control in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the Cooperative Solution 
(square marker) eradication path for low initial levels of infection. 
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Figure 3.a: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) eradication path for intermediate initial levels of 
infection. 
 
 
Figure 3.b: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) eradication path for intermediate initial levels of 
infection. 
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Figure 4.a: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) paths converging to steady-state for low initial levels of 
infection. 
 
 
Figure 4.b: control in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the Cooperative Solution 
(square marker) paths converging to steady-state for low initial levels of infection. 
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Figure 5.a: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) paths converging to steady-state for intermediate initial 
levels of infection. 
 
 
Figure 5.b: control in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the Cooperative Solution 
(square marker) paths converging to steady-state for intermediate initial levels of infection. 
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Figure 6.a: infection prevalence in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the 
Cooperative Solution (square marker) paths converging to steady-state for high initial levels of 
infection. 
 
 
Figure 6.b: control in region 1 along the OLNE (cross marker) and the Cooperative Solution 
(square marker) paths converging to steady-state for high initial levels of infection. 
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Figure 7.a: relationship between control effort and disease prevalence (for region 1) along the 
optimal eradication path for low initial levels of infection. 
 
 
Figure 7.b: relationship between control effort and disease prevalence (for region 1) along the 
optimal eradication path for intermediate initial levels of infection. 
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Figure 7.c: relationship between control effort and disease prevalence (for region 1) along the 
optimal path converging to steady-state for high initial levels of infection. 
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Figure A.1: the determinant of A.6 is positive in regions (I) and (III), while it is negative in 
region (II). 
 
